USA v. Curtis Waldron by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-28-2018 
USA v. Curtis Waldron 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Curtis Waldron" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 709. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/709 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-1745 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
  
CURTIS WALDRON, 
       Appellant 
 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-15-cr-00283-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 6, 2018 
 
Before: MCKEE, AMBRO, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 28, 2018) 
 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Curtis Waldron was arrested on October 2, 2015, for distribution and possession 
with intent to distribute heroin, marijuana, and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1).  He pled guilty in September 2016.  The District Court found Waldron to be 
a career offender based on two predicate convictions for which he was incarcerated 
within fifteen years of his current conviction.  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  Waldron argues on 
appeal that his conviction, on November 8, 1994, is outside the look-back period, and 
thus it was improperly considered.  He also challenges the application of the career-
offender enhancement on the basis that the 1994 conviction does not meet the definition 
of a “controlled substance offense” under § 4B1.2(b).  
 We apply plenary review to Waldron’s challenge to the District Court’s 
application and interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines.  Any facts used in the 
Guidelines’ calculation are reviewed for clear error.  United States v. Wood, 526 F.3d 82, 
85 (3d Cir. 2008).  Because Waldron failed to raise the applicability of the career-
offender enhancement in the District Court, we review for plain error.  United States v. 
Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 517 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 The career-offender sentencing enhancement subjects offenders to an elevated 
Guidelines range where the offense under review is a crime of violence or a controlled 
substance offense and the offender has two prior felony convictions for crimes of 
violence or a controlled substance.  The look-back period to determine whether a career-
offender enhancement applies “count[s] any prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding 
one year and one month, whenever imposed, that resulted in the defendant being 
incarcerated during any part of such fifteen-year period.”  U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1).  
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Waldron bases his argument that the 1994 conviction is outside the look-back 
period on U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 Application Note 2’s language: “For the purposes of 
applying § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c), the length of a sentence of imprisonment is the stated 
maximum.”  The violation occurred, as noted, on November 8, 1994 and had a maximum 
sentence of five years, making the maximum date of release for Waldron November 8, 
1999.  But due to parole violations and subsequent revocations, he was instead 
incarcerated until re-parole on November 13, 2000.  
Waldron concedes he was incarcerated until then due to a parole revocation.  His 
sentence thus falls under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k):  “[I]n the case of a prior revocation of 
probation, parole, supervised release, special parole, or mandatory release, add the 
original term of imprisonment to any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation.”  
The Guidelines establish that a court when sentencing should look to the last date of 
incarceration to determine if the sentence falls within the look-back period.  In addition, 
Waldron’s interpretation of Application Note 2 is mistaken.  We have found the 
language—“the length of a sentence of imprisonment is the stated maximum”—to mean 
the maximum imposed initial sentence plus the maximum imposed sentence for the 
subsequent parole revocation.  United States v. Rengifo, 832 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 
2016).  
Until November 13, 2000, Waldron was incarcerated for a parole violation 
stemming from his November 8, 1994 narcotics conviction.  His October 2, 2015 
conviction has an applicable look-back period of fifteen years, thus on or after October 2, 
2000.  Because Waldron was incarcerated after October 2, 2000 for his November 8, 
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1994 conviction and subsequent parole revocation, it is within the applicable look-back 
period. 
Waldron also contends his 1994 drug conviction is not a predicate offense for the 
purposes of the career-offender section of the Guidelines.  We disagree.  We apply the 
“modified categorical approach” to determine whether Waldron’s violation of 35 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 113(a)(30) qualifies as a predicate offense under the Guidelines.  United 
States v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 2014).  This means we may “look[] to a 
limited class of documents (for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or plea 
agreement and colloquy) to determine what crime, with what elements, a defendant was 
convicted of.”  Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016).  We then compare 
that crime to the definition of a controlled substance offense under the Guidelines.  See 
id.  This means it is . . . 
[a]n offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, 
distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit 
substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit 
substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.  
 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).   
Waldron’s 1994 conviction was for possession with the intent to distribute 
approximately half an ounce of crack cocaine, a controlled substance.  He was sentenced 
to two-to-five years’ imprisonment for that offense.  Applying the modified categorical 
approach, his conviction is a predicate offense because it involved “the possession of a 
controlled substance . . . with intent to . . . distribute.”  Id.  Thus it falls under the career-
offender section of the Guidelines.   
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The District Court did not err in determining that Waldron was a career offender 
under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  Accordingly, we affirm.   
 
